
























































the	evidence,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	adversarial	 process.	 Five	 factors	underlie	 this	 rationale:	 the	
hearsay	dangers,	demeanour	evidence,	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant,	






















































































is	 applied	 in	 Canada	 today.	 This	 thesis	 examines	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale	and	current	application.	The	analysis	occurs	in	three	steps.	In	section	1,	the	





1 David Jardine, Criminal Trials: Vol 1 (London: Charles Knight, 1832) at 427. 
2 Gordon Cudmore, The Mystery of Hearsay (Toronto: Carswell, 2009) at 18. 
3 Ibid. at 19-20. 
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Overall,	 the	 thesis	 finds	 that	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 has	 three	 aspects:	
concern	with	the	inherent	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence,	concern	with	procedural	reliability	in	
admitting	 the	 evidence,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 Five	 factors	 underlie	 this	
rationale:	the	hearsay	dangers,	demeanour	evidence,	the	lack	of	opportunity	to	cross-examine	
the	declarant,	 the	evidence	 is	unsworn,	and	 fairness	 in	 the	adversarial	process	 (this	 is	both	a	
factor	and	an	aspect	of	the	historical	rationale).	While	there	are	many	differences	between	the	
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5 Alan W. Bryant, Sidney N. Lederman & Michelle K. Fuerst, Sopinka, Lederman & Bryant – The Law of Evidence 









the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 ability	 to	 prohibit	 prior	 inconsistent	 statements,	 thereby	 discouraging	 the	
police	from	engaging	in	improper	interrogation	techniques.7	There	is	the	view	that	the	hearsay	
rule	 encourages	 members	 of	 the	 public	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 trial	 process	 by	 preventing	
professional	 witnesses	 from	 relaying	 the	 observations	 of	 subjects	 of	 their	 investigations.8	 In	
addition,	the	state	is	prevented	from	using	its	superior	resources	to	gather	remote	statements	
for	 use	 against	marginalized	 accused	 persons.9	 These	 are	 just	 some	 of	 the	 rationales.	More	
abound.	 There	 is	 also	 a	wealth	 of	 commentary	 on	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 practical	 application	 in	
Canada.10	 While	 there	 is	 literature	 on	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale,	 and	 separate	
literature	 on	 the	 current	 rule’s	 rationale	 and	 application,	 there	 is	 no	 literature	 on	 how	 the	
																																																						
6 Bruce P. Archibald, “The Canadian Hearsay Revolution: Is Half a Loaf Better Than No Loaf at All?” (1999) 25 
Queen’s LJ 1 at 24; See also Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, “Less Evidence, Better Knowledge” (2015) 60:2 McGill LJ 175. 
7 See Charles Nesson, “The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts” (1985) 98:7 
Har L Rev 1357; Charles Nesson & Yochai Benkler, “Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and 
Corroboration Under the Confrontational Clause” (1995) 81 Va L Rev 149. 
8 A.L.-T. Choo, Abuse of Process and Judicial Stays of Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), cited 
in Archibald, supra note 6 at 24. 
9 E. Swift, “Smoke and Mirrors: The failure of the Supreme Court’s Accuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires 
a New Look at Confrontation” (1993) 22 Capital UL Rev 145 at 172, cited in Archibald supra note 6 at 24. 
10 See generally Mike Madden, “Anchoring the law in a bed of principle: A critique of, and proposal to improve, 
Canadian and American hearsay and confrontation law” (2012) 35 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 395; Archibald supra note 
6 at 24. 
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hearsay	 rule’s	historical	 rationale	differs	 from	 its	practical	application.	This	 thesis	breaks	new	
ground	by	systematically	comparing	the	two.		
Such	analysis	 is	 important	 for	 lawyers,	evidence	scholars,	or	anyone	who	testifies	 in	a	
courtroom.	 Hearsay	 is	 fundamental	 knowledge	 for	 litigation.	 Understanding	 the	 difference	
between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	current	application	aids	in	understanding	how	













The	 second	 half	 considers	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 practical	 application	 in	 Canada,	 and	





Comparing	 the	difference	between	the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	 rationale	and	practical	













practical	 application,	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 differences	 are	 identified	 and	 evaluated.	 In	 many	
instances,	the	differences	prevent	the	hearsay	rule	from	achieving	its	purpose.	The	discussion	
occurs	on	two	levels.	The	hearsay	jurisprudence	is	examined	to	determine	if	differences	between	





Not	 all	 of	 the	 hearsay	 exceptions	 are	 analyzed.	 There	 are	 over	 a	 dozen	 recognized	
exceptions	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 taxonomy	 of	 exceptions	 employed	 in	 Canada’s	 leading	















11 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5. 
12 S. Casey Hill, David M. Tanovich, & Louis P. Strezos, McWilliams' Canadian Criminal Evidence, Fifth Edition 










Langbein,	 Richard	 Friedman,	 Edmund	 Morgan,	 H.L.	 Ho,	 and	 Fredrick	 Koch.	 This	 section	 will	
discuss	the	six	major	theories	and	highlight	points	of	disagreement	between	them.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 the	 theories	 are	 products	 of	 different	



























The	value	of	cross-examination	 is	 its	ability	to	show	lay	 jurors	the	potential	sources	of	
unreliability	in	testimony.18	Lay	jurors	will	be	less	inclined	to	overvalue	testimonial	evidence	if	
the	frailties	of	the	testimony	are	brought	to	light	under	cross-examination.	Wigmore’s	privileging	




13 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law: Including 
the Statutes and Judicial Decisions of All Jurisdictions of the United States and Canada, 4 vols (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1904) at vol II, p. 1685-1686, §1364, cited in Frederick W. J. Koch, Wigmore and Historical Aspects of the Hearsay 
Rule (PhD Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, 2004) [unpublished] at 89. 
14 Wigmore, supra note 13 at §1364, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 90. 
15 Koch, supra note 13 at 242.  
16 Wigmore, supra note 13 at 1688, §1364, cited in Koch, supra note 13. 
17 Ibid. [Emphasis added]. 
18 Koch, supra note 13 at 90 






judges.20	 Cross-examination	 existed	 as	 a	 corrective	 measure	 against	 lay	 jurors’	 inability	 to	
properly	assess	testimony.		
It	follows	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	not	necessary	when	cross-examination	is	not	necessary	








and	 ‘reliability’	 criteria	 that	 have	 taken	 a	 foothold	 in	 Canadian	 hearsay	 jurisprudence.	 In	
Wigmore’s	 lexicon,	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 will	 exist	 if,	 first,	 the	 declarant	 of	 the	
statement	cannot	 testify;	and,	 second,	 the	 testimony	will	not	pose	a	 risk	of	misevaluation	by	




21 Koch, supra note 13 at 90-94. 
























23 Wigmore, supra note 13 at vol. III, p. 154, §1420. 
24 Koch, supra note 13 at 90 








a	 purpose	 different	 from	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 It	 is	 designed	 to	 “remove,	 before	 the	 evidence	 is	
introduced,	such	sources	of	danger	and	distrust	as	experience	may	have	shown	to	lurk	within	
it.”28	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	hearsay	rule,	which	is	solely	concerned	with	lay	jurors	overvaluing	
testimonial	 evidence.	 The	 oath	 serves	 to	 improve	 the	 reliability	 of	 testimonial	 evidence	 by	











26 Wigmore, supra note 13 at p. 1709-1710, §1370, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 87. 
27 Ibid. at p. 1695, §1365, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 87. 




was	 a	 professor	 at	 Harvard	 Law	 School	 while	Wigmore	was	 a	 student	 at	 the	 school.	 Thayer	
believed	that	most	common	law	exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	developed	to	prevent	lay	jurors	
from	misevaluating	evidence.29	Hearsay	was	one	of	several	such	types	of	evidence.		








system	of	proof.30	A	purely	 rational	 system	of	proof	 is	one	 in	which	 “all	 information	 [that	 is]	
logically	 probative	 [is]	 prima	 facie	 admitted	 and	 considered	 by	 the	 trier	 of	 fact.”31	 Thayer	
considered	the	Continental	system	to	be	an	example	of	a	purely	rational	system	of	proof.32	He	
reasoned	that	if	the	common	law	was	a	purely	rational	system,	one	would	expect	to	see	the	same	
exclusionary	 rules	 of	 evidence	 as	 the	 Continental	 system.	 This	 symmetry	 does	 not	 exist.	
Therefore,	reasoned	Thayer,	there	must	be	an	additional	influence	on	the	common	law	system.	
																																																						
29 Koch, supra note 13 at 61. 
30 James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1898) at 
267-268, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 63. 




That	 influence	 is	 role	of	 lay	 jurors	as	a	 trier	of	 fact.33	This	 feature	 resulted	 in	 the	creation	of	
atypical	exclusionary	rules	of	evidence,	of	which	the	hearsay	rule	is	one	example.	
Second,	 Thayer	 used	 historical	 research	 to	 show	 how	 judges	 went	 about	 creating	
exclusionary	rules	of	evidence	to	guard	against	the	perceived	evaluative	ability	of	 lay	 jurors.34	
Wigmore	 built	 upon	 Thayer’s	work	 in	 his	 discussion	 of	 hearsay	 in	 the	Treatise	 on	 the	Anglo-
American	System	of	Evidence	in	Trials	at	Common	Law.	Wigmore’s	theory	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	
historical	rationale	stands	on	the	shoulders	of	Thayer’s	research.		
Thayer	 and	 Wigmore’s	 endorsement	 of	 jury	 control	 theory	 has	 been	 profoundly	
influential	 in	 the	academic	 literature.	They	have	been	described	as	 “dominating	 the	world	of	
evidence	 ‘like	a	colossus’	during	the	first	half	century	after	the	publication	of	their	respective	





	 The	 second	 theory	 advanced	 is	 by	 John	 Langbein.	 A	 legal	 historian,	 Langbein	 uses	
historical	 evidence	 to	 nuance	 jury	 control	 theory.	 Langbein	 agrees	 with	Wigmore	 that	 most	
exclusionary	rules	of	evidence,	 including	the	hearsay	rule,	were	developed	by	judges	to	guard	
against	 the	 perceived	 tendency	 of	 lay	 jurors	 to	 overvalue	 testimonial	 evidence.	 However,	
																																																						
33 Thayer, supra note 30 at 47. 
34 Ibid. at 109-114 & 137 ff, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 64. 
35 Koch, supra note 13 at 64. 














the	evidence.39	With	 respect	 to	 the	 accused	person’s	 case,	 a	 judge	was	 closer	 to	 that	of	 the	
inquisitorial	judge	in	the	Continental	system	than	to	the	passive	observer	in	modern	Canadian	
criminal	law.40	The	judge	was	de	facto	counsel	for	the	accused	person.	The	judge	could	adjust	the	
inchoate	 standard	of	proof	 to	account	 for	 the	prosecution’s	 representation	by	a	professional	
advocate	and	the	accused	person’s	self-representation.	The	judge	could	also	control	the	accused	
																																																						
37 John H. Langbein, “The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers” (1978) 45(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 at 306-15 [Before 
Lawyers]. Langbein did not challenge Wigmore’s description of sworn hearsay. 
38 John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 233-42, 
cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 20. 
39 Lisa Dufraimont, “Evidence Law and the Jury: A Reassessment” (2008) 53 McGill LJ 199 at 220 [Evidence Law 
and the Jury] 






jury	were	eliminated	or	 significantly	 curtailed.42	At	 the	 same	 time,	accused	persons	began	 to	
receive	 professional	 representation	 in	 felony	 trials	 from	 defence	 counsel.	 The	 advent	 of	 the	
defence	counsel	shook	up	the	working	relationship	between	 judge,	 jury,	and	accused	person.	
Defence	 counsel	 now	 produced	 evidence	 through	 cross-examination.	 Defence	 counsel	 also	
asserted	measures	against	judicial	interference,	such	as	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination	
and	the	articulation	the	criminal	standard	of	proof.43		










41 Ibid. at 308. 
42 Ibid. at 220. 
43 John H. Langbein, “Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources” (1996) 96 
Colum. L. Rev. 1168 at 1199 [Historical Foundations]. 
44 Ibid. at 1195-1202 
45 See e.g. criticism of some scholars in the literature levied in Evidence Law and the Jury, supra note 39 at 222.  
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about	 lay	 jurors.	Examining	early	British	cases	 law	on	sworn	statements,	Friedman	makes	the	
historical	argument	that	the	hearsay	rule	emerged	as	a	product	of	the	accused	person’s	right	to	
confront	their	accuser.		
Freidman	provides	 a	 variety	 of	 examples	 from	 sixteenth	 to	 eighteenth	 century	British	
common	 law.	 For	 instance,	 the	 jurisprudence	 surrounding	 depositions	 crystalized	 during	 this	
time.	 Depositions	 were	 not	 allowed	 to	 be	 used	 at	 trial	 unless	 the	 adverse	 party	 had	 an	
opportunity	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.47	Similarly,	Magistrates	under	the	reign	of	Queen	
Mary	could	take	statements	sworn	 from	witnesses	 in	 felony	cases	 for	 the	express	purpose	of	
																																																						
46 Richard D. Friedman, “No Link: The Jury and The Origins of the Confrontation Right and the Hearsay Rule” in 
John W. Carins & Grant McLeod, eds. The Dearest Birth Right of the People of England: The Jury in the History of 
the Common Law (Oxford: Hard Publishing, 2002) at 93. 












to	demand	 that	witnesses	be	brought	before	 them	“face	 to	 face”.50	By	 the	mid-1600s	 it	was	
understood	through	acts	of	Parliament	and	by	the	courts	that	treason	witnesses	must	be	cross-
examined	by	the	accused.51	
Freidman	readily	admits	 that	 the	right	 to	confrontation	was	not	cleanly	applied	 in	 the	
time	leading	up	to	the	eighteenth	century.	Some	courts	enforced	the	right	sporadically.	Still,	the	
affirmation	or	denial	of	the	right	was	never	dependant	on	the	jury’s	perceived	ability	to	evaluate	
the	 hearsay	 evidence.	 The	 concern	was	 always	 the	 procedural	 issue	 of	 whether	 the	witness	
should	give	their	testimony	in	open	court,	face	to	face	with	the	adverse	party.52		
																																																						
48 Ibid. at 96. 
49 R. v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163 at 165, 87 ER 584 at 585, quoted in Ibid. 
50 Friedman, supra note 46 at 97. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid. at 98. 
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Friedman	recognizes	 that	 the	right	 to	confrontation	 is	narrower	than	the	scope	of	 the	
hearsay	 rule.	 The	 right	 to	 confrontation,	 as	 conceived	 by	 Freidman,	 only	 extends	 to	 sworn	
statements	taken	for	the	purpose	of	serving	as	testimony.53	It	does	not	extend	to	out	of	court	
statements	not	made	 for	 the	purpose	of	 litigation;	 for	example,	a	 casual	 conversation	with	a	
civilian	 in	 which	 an	 accused	 person	 incriminates	 him	 or	 herself.	 Moreover,	 the	 right	 to	

















55 Ibid. at 99. 
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until	 the	 1700s,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 unrelated	 to	 juries.56	 Hearsay	 is	 rejected	 because	 it	 is	 not	
information	based	on	a	witness’	observations:	 it	 is	 information	based	on	what	 the	witness	 is	
credulous	enough	to	believe.	A	hearsay	statement	is	not	made	under	oath.57	And	the	opposing	
party	in	litigation	is	unable	to	receive	the	benefit	of	cross-examining	the	hearsay	declarant.		
Cross-examination	 is	 necessary	 for	 its	 ability	 to	 shed	 light	 the	on	potential	 sources	of	
unreliability	 in	 testimonial	 evidence.	 Morgan	 identified	 four	 ‘hearsay	 dangers’	 that	 exist	













56 Edmund M. Morgan, “Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept” (1948) 62 Harv L Rev 177 at 
182-83 [Hearsay Dangers]. 
57 Edmund M. Morgan, “The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence” (1936) 4 U Chi L Rev. 247 at 254 [Jury 
and Exclusionary Rules] 
58 Hearsay Dangers, supra note 56. 
59 Jury and Exclusionary Rules, supra note 57 at 255. 
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rule,	 is	 influenced	by	 the	 reliability	 of	 hearsay	 evidence.	 Some	of	 the	 exceptions	 to	 the	 rule,	
however,	are	influenced	by	concerns	about	the	jury.61		








rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Hearsay	 is	 based	 on	 two	 conceptions	 of	 fairness.	 First,	 the	
unfairness	 to	 the	adverse	party	 in	assuming	 that	 the	declarant	would	have	proven	his	or	her	
hearsay	 statement	 if	 he	 or	 she	 testified.62	 Under	 the	 adversarial	 system	 generally,	 the	 party	
producing	a	witness	bears	the	risk	that	the	witness	will	not	be	able	to	prove	his	or	her	anticipated	
evidence.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 reasons	 why	 a	 witness’	 testimony	 may	 not	 prove	 their	
																																																						
60 Ibid. at 255. 
61 Ibid at 255-56. 








Ho	 theorizes	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 fairness	 caused	 by	 this	 aspect	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 shaped	 the	
creation	of	the	hearsay	rule	and	its	exceptions.63	
	 The	 second	 conception	 of	 fairness	 is	 the	 disadvantage	 to	 the	 adverse	 party	 by	 the	
production	of	hearsay	evidence	without	giving	that	party	the	chance	to	remove	the	prejudice	




The	opposing	party	 has	 the	opportunity	 to	 remove	 the	prejudice	 through	 cross-examination,	
which	can	reveal	unreliability	in	the	testimony.	When	hearsay	evidence	is	admitted,	it	too	creates	




63 Ibid. at 409-10. 










running	away	 from	a	 fire	 that	he	had	started.	The	Privy	Council	held	 that	 the	 statement	was	











65 Ibid.  
66 See for e.g. Ibid. at 412-418. 
67 Teper v. R., [1952] AC 480, cited in Ibid at 414. 
68 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 414. 
69 Ibid.  











	 Subramaniam	v.	Public	Prosecutor73	demonstrates	how	exceptions	 to	 the	hearsay	 rule	
were	able	to	form	historically.	In	this	case	the	accused	person	was	charged	with	possession	of	
ammunition	for	the	purpose	of	helping	terrorists.	The	accused	person	used	the	duress	defence.	









71 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 415. 
72 Ibid. 
























75 Frederick Koch, “The Hearsay Rule’s True Reason d’etre: It’s Implications for the New Principled Approach to 
Admitting Hearsay Evidence” (2005) 37:2 Ottawa L. Rev. 249 at 253 [Hearsay’s Reason d’etre]. 
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certain	 kinds	of	 hearsay	 evidence	 should	be	 excluded	because	 they	 are	 too	unreliable.76	 The	
second	reason	is	the	epistemic	need	for	two	elements	of	testimonial	evidence,	cross-examination	













Second,	 the	same	parties	 rule.82	Depositions	 taken	 in	one	proceeding	were	prohibited	
from	being	used	in	another	if	the	parties	or	issues	were	not	the	same	in	both.	The	common	thread	
																																																						
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. at 268-256. 
80 Ibid. See also, Koch, supra note 13 at 238-239. 
81 Koch, supra note 13 at 183-191. 


















Unsworn	hearsay	 statements	were	prohibited	before	 sworn	hearsay	 statements.	They	
were	first	prohibited	 in	the	courts	of	equity	and	then	 in	the	courts	of	common	 law.	Unsworn	
hearsay	statements	were	prohibited	 for	one	of	 two	reasons	 related	 to	 reliability.86	First,	 they	
were	generally	perceived	by	the	courts	to	be	too	unreliable	to	be	given	consideration	if	other,	
																																																						
83 Ibid. at 210-223. 
84 Ibid. at 223-231. 
85 Ibid. at 231-239. 









Bailey	 Session	 Papers,	 and	 Sir	 Dudley	 Ryder’s	 Notes.87	 Koch’s	 research	 represents	 the	 most	
comprehensive	examination	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale.		
	 Koch	categorically	 rejects	Wigmore’s	assertion	that	 the	hearsay	rule	emerged	out	of	a	
judicial	concern	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	The	seven	distinct	exclusionary	rules,	
five	for	sworn	hearsay	and	two	for	unsworn	hearsay,	that	merged	into	a	single	hearsay	rule	by	
1750	 are	 unconcerned	with	 the	 evaluative	 capacity	 of	 lay	 jurors.	 Rather,	 the	 two	 underlying	
reasons	 for	 the	 seven	 exclusionary	 rules	 are	 the	 unreliability	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 and	 the	
epistemic	need	for	testimonial	evidence;	that	is,	demeanour	evidence	and	cross-examination.		











This	 section	will	 reconcile	 the	perceived	debate	 in	 the	 literature	and	advance	a	 single	
historical	rationale	of	the	hearsay	rule.	It	will	explain	that	the	hearsay	rule	is	the	product	of	five	




























The	 first	 rationale,	 inherent	 reliability,	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 accuracy	 of	 an	 untested	
hearsay	statement.	The	locus	of	judicial	concern	is	the	accuracy	of	a	statement	when	it	is	made	
out	of	court	and	without	any	of	the	tests	of	courtroom	procedure	(for	example,	the	oath	or	cross-
examination).	The	 inherent	 reliability	 rationale	 is	derived	 from	historical	 judicial	concern	with	













cross-examination	do	not	 influence	the	accuracy	of	a	declarant’s	statement	when	it	 is	 initially	






The	 third	 rationale	 encompasses	 one	 factor,	 fairness	 to	 the	 opposing	 party	 in	 the	
adversarial	process.		
The	spillage	of	the	five	historical	factors	between	the	three	categories	of	rationales	is	not	
neat.	 Indeed,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 factors	 touch	 upon	 all	 three	 rationales	 in	











The	 scholars	 are	 unwittingly	 describing	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 same	 rationale.	 That	
rationale	has	three	aspects:	the	inherent	reliability	of	hearsay	evidence,	the	procedural	reliability	
in	 admitting	 the	 evidence,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 The	 hearsay	 rule	 was	
31	
	
developed	over	155	years.	 It	began	 in	1595	with	 the	establishment	of	 the	affidavits	 rule.88	 It	
crystallized	in	1750	with	the	fusion	of	various	exclusionary	rules.89	During	this	155-year	span	the	
doctrine	that	became	the	hearsay	rule	was	curated,	gradually,	by	different	judges	in	the	different	




The	 scholars	 discussing	 the	 historical	 rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 developed	 their	
theories	through	an	examination	of	different	courts	during	differing	time	periods.	It	too	makes	







the	 trier	 of	 fact	 potential	 sources	 of	 unreliability	 in	 the	 testimony.	 Others	 hold	 that	 cross-
examination	is	necessary	to	remedy	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	As	will	be	discussed	in	
																																																						
88 Koch, supra note 13 at 183. 















When	 methodological	 divergence	 is	 peeled	 away	 and	 the	 theories	 are	 laid	 bare,	 there	 is	
surprising	agreement	between	all	 scholars	on	 the	basic	 tenets	of	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	
rationale.	Those	basic	tenets	are	concerns	with	the	inherent	and	procedural	reliability	of	hearsay	












tests	 it	 with	 historical	 cases.	 The	 theory	 is	 coloured	 from	 start	 to	 finish	 in	 the	 language	 of	
philosophical	fairness.	Looking	beyond	the	words	reveals	that	Ho	attributed	the	hearsay	rule’s	












well	 the	declarant	would	have	performed	 if	 his	 or	 her	 statement	was	 tested	 for	 the	hearsay	
dangers,	or	assume	that	statement	would	have	been	unaffected	by	testing	entirely.	
																																																						













their	 different	methodologies,	 attribute	 the	 rule’s	 ascendance	 to	 different	 factors.	Wigmore	





not	 subject	 to	 cross-examination.95	 The	historical	 rationale	 for	 the	hearsay	 rule	was	 squarely	
placed	within	a	concern	for	the	rectitude	of	the	decision.		
																																																						
92 If Ho realized that the reliability of hearsay evidence is tied to this theory, he failed to articulate it. 
93 Wigmore, supra note 13 at pp. 1685-1686, §1364, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 3. 
94 Koch, supra note 13 at 242.  
95 Wigmore, supra note 13 at p. 1688, §1364 
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Langbein	 reached	 substantially	 the	 same	 conclusion	 but	 attributed	 the	 rationale	 to	
different	 factors.	 In	 addition	 to	 examining	Wigmore’s	 sources,	 Langbein	 examined	 published	
pamphlets	he	labelled	the	Old	Bailey	Session	Papers	and	Sir	Dudley	Ryder’s	Notes.96	From	this	
methodology	Langbein	too	concluded	that	the	prohibition	of	unsworn	hearsay	evidence	emerged	
out	 of	 judicial	 concern	 that	 lay	 jurors	 would	 overvalue	 testimonial	 evidence.97	 This	 squarely	
placed	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	 rationale	with	a	concern	 for	 the	rectitude	of	 the	decision.	
However,	 instead	 of	 attributing	 the	 concern	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 cross-examination,	 Langbein	




Langbein	 saw	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 emerge	 at	 a	 later	 time	 because	 he	 was	 able	 to	 use	





hearsay	rule	 in	the	 late	1600s.	Langbein	 interpreted	these	comments	as	attributing	weight	to	
																																																						
96 Langbein, supra note 38; Historical Foundations, supra note 43. 
97 Langbein, supra note 38.	
98 Langbein did not challenge Wigmore’s description of the development of sworn hearsay: see e.g. Before Lawyers, 
supra note 37. 
99 Koch, supra note 13 at 19-20. 
100 Historical Foundations, supra note 43 at 1180, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 46. 
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admissible	 hearsay	 evidence.101	 This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	 Langbein	 was	 more	 correct	 than	
Wigmore	because	Langbein	used	more	sources.	To	the	contrary,	Langbein	has	been	criticized	for	
drawing	invalid	conclusions	from	Ryder’s	Notes	and	the	Old	Bailey	Session	Papers.102	The	point	is	









rule’s	 rationale,103	 such	 as	 concern	 with	 inherent	 reliability	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	
process.	These	rationales	share	no	nexus	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	This	is	not	to	
suggest	 that	Wigmore	 and	 Langbein	 believed	 that	 concerns	with	 the	 inherent	 reliability	 and	
fairness	 of	 hearsay	 evidence	 had	 no	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	Wigmore	 and	
Langbein	 believed	 that	 these	 rationales	 had	 a	 role,	 but	 their	methodologies	 caused	 them	 to	
deemphasize	 the	 rationales	 and	 express	 their	 role	 as	 a	 function	 of	 judicial	 concern	with	 the	
evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	
																																																						
101 Langbein, supra note 38 at 234-242, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 20. 
102 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 265-66. 


















the	accuracy	of	 the	 trials	by	 reference	 to	 the	 juristic	 literature	of	 the	period.106	 In	all,	 Koch’s	
research	 is	 the	most	 comprehensive	 and	 robust	 examination	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	
rationale.		
It	 is	not	surprising,	then,	that	Koch	identifies	all	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	
rationale.	 Koch	 asserts	 that	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 began	 as	 seven	 distinct	 exclusionary	 rules	 of	
																																																						
104 Koch, supra note 13.	
105 Ibid. at 36-41. 




one	 of	 two	 underlying	 reasons:	 the	 unreliability	 of	 the	 evidence	 and	 the	 epistemic	 need	 for	
testimonial	evidence;	demeanour	evidence	and	cross-examination.	The	inherent	and	procedural	
reliability	 aspects	 of	 the	 historical	 hearsay	 rationale	 are	 explicitly	 recognized.	 Fairness	 in	 the	
adversarial	 process	 is	 implicit	 in	 the	 requirement	 for	 demeanour	 evidence	 and	 cross-









created.	 Using	 existing	 research	 in	 the	 literature,	 this	 section	 will	 explain	 how	 five	 factors	





107 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 403. 







cases	 from	 the	 common	 law	 courts	 of	 the	 1600s	 in	which	 hearsay	 evidence	 is	 not	 admitted	
because	of	 the	 inability	 to	 test	 the	hearsay	dangers.	The	written	reasons	are	not	detailed,	 so	
some	 inferences	need	 to	be	made	 to	 appreciate	 the	 concern	of	 the	 courts.	 In	 the	1680	high	
treason	case	of	Anderson109	an	unsworn	letter	was	tendered	as	evidence.	The	judge	refused	to	
admit	the	letter;	however,	he	asked	if	anyone	was	able	to	testify	to	the	letter’s	contents.	If	they	
were	 able	 to	 testify	 their	 testimony	 would	 be	 admissible,	 presumably	 due	 to	 the	 epistemic	
advantage	of	testimonial	evidence.110	The	court	could	test	the	witness’	sincerity,	the	accuracy	of	
the	letter’s	language,	how	well	the	letter	reflected	the	witness’	understanding	of	what	happened,	






109 The Trials of Lionel Anderson alia Murray, William Russell alias Napper, Charles Parris alias Parry, Henry 
Starkey, James Corker, William Marshal, and Alexander Lumsden, with the Arrigment of David Joseph Kemish, at 
the Old Bailey, for High Treason, being Romish Priests (1680), 7 Cobb St Tr 811 at 865 (Comms of O & T), cited in 
Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 283-284. 
110 Ibid. 








of	 an	 oath.	 There	 may	 have	 been	 skepticism	 about	 litigants	 manipulating	 written	 hearsay	
evidence	before	 it	was	presented	to	the	court.	These	alternative	reasons	do	not	preclude	the	
hearsay	dangers	 from	 influencing	a	decision	 to	exclude	hearsay	evidence.	At	 their	 core,	each	

















	 Demeanour	 evidence	 is	 the	 information	 that	 can	 be	 obtained	 from	 a	 declarant’s	













manner	 of	 their	 delivery:	 and	 their	 falsity	 may	 sometimes	 be	 discovered	 by	
questions	 that	 the	 party	 may	 ask	 them,	 and	 by	 examining	 them	 to	 particular	
circumstances.115	
	
In	 1606	 the	 Chief	 Justice	 of	 the	 King’s	 Bench	 said	 viva	 voce	 testimony	 was	 preferable	 to	
depositions,	at	least	in	part	because	jurors	could	better	weigh	the	testimony	after	observing	the	
																																																						
113 Koch, supra note 13 at 87. 
114 Fenwick’s Trial (1696), 13 Cobb. St. Tr. 537 (Parl.), quoted in Koch, supra note 13 at 138. 








factual	 issues	 to	 juries,	 where	 witnesses	 testified	 viva	 voce	 and	 were	 subject	 to	 cross-
examination.118	 The	 change	 suggests	 that	 when	 factual	 issues	 were	 in	 dispute,	 the	 Court	 of	
Chancery	wanted	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 to	 assess	 the	 declarant’s	 sincerity	 by	 observing	 his	 or	 her	
demeanor,	in	addition	to	subjecting	the	witness	to	cross-examination.	It	would	be	a	stretch	to	











116 Le Case del Union, del Realm, D’Escose, ove Angleterre (1606), Moo KB 790 at 798, 72 ER 908 (KB) at 913 
[cited to ER], cited in Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 277. 
117 Dame Darcy v. Leigh (1619), Hob 324, 80 ER 466 at 467 [cited to ER], cited in Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra 
note 75 at 277. 
118 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 277 
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cross-examination	 has	 been	 a	 method	 of	 courtroom	 procedure	 to	 test	 the	 accuracy	 of	 a	
declarant’s	statement.	




are	earlier	 references	 to	 the	 lack	of	opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	but	during	 those	 time	













119 Koch, supra note 13 at 288-300 
120 See for e.g. Koch, supra note 13 at 197. 
121 Rushworth et al. v. Pembroke (Countess of) et al. (1668-69), Hard 472, 145 ER 553 (Ex Ct), cited in Koch, supra 
note 13 at 202. 
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was	 added	 as	 a	 reason	 in	 the	 late	 1600s.	 After	 this	 time	 such	 depositions	 were	 considered	
voluntary	 affidavits	 and	 excluded	 because	 the	 declarant	 could	 not	 be	 cross-examined.122	
Conversely,	 in	 the	 1692	 case	 of	Howard	 v.	 Tremain	 a	 hearsay	 deposition	was	 admitted	 into	
evidence	 because	 the	 opposing	 party	 “did	 cross-examine”	 the	 declarant	 at	 an	 earlier	
proceeding.123	
By	 1701,	 unsworn	 hearsay	 was	 beginning	 to	 be	 excluded	 from	 serious	 criminal	 trials	












jurors	 to	 overvalue	 testimonial	 evidence.	 Under	 this	 view,	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-
																																																						
122 Henry Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence (Dublin: Sarah Cotter, 1761) cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 236. 
123 Howard v. Tremain (1692), 4 Mod 146, 87 ER. 314 (KB) (sub. nom. Howard v. Tremaine) 1 Show 363, 89 ER 
641, Carth 265, 90 ER 757, 1 Salk 278, 91 ER 243, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 236. 










The	axis	of	debate	 in	 the	 literature	 is	a	philosophical	 view	on	an	empirical	 issue:	how	
concerned	was	the	judiciary	with	the	ability	of	 lay	jurors	to	evaluate	hearsay	evidence?	While	
methodology	does	not	cause	the	debate,	it	does	shed	light	on	the	answer.	If	one	considers	the	
entire	 155-year	 span	 in	 which	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 developed,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 historical	 judicial	
concern	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 a	 hearsay	 statement’s	 declarant	 was	
premised	on	the	unreliability	of	hearsay	evidence.	Conclusions	to	the	contrary	are	belied	by	the	
the	historical	record.	Wigmore’s	research	was	based	on	an		incomplete	and	temporally	limited	






125 Ibid. at 49-50. 
126 Koch, supra note 13 at 242. 
46	
	




of	 the	 common	 law.128	 Additionally,	 the	 first	 mention	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	 in	 the	 surviving	 case	 law	 is	 in	 the	 1700s.	 By	 this	 time	 the	
hearsay	rule	had	already	been	developed	out	of	concerns	with	the	lack	of	an	oath	and	demeanour	
evidence.129	 Both	of	 these	 factors	 relate	 to	 the	 reliability	 of	 hearsay	 evidence.	 They	have	no	
relation	to	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors.	Even	if	the	judicial	need	for	cross-examination	
stemmed	from	a	concern	with	the	evaluative	capacity	of	lay	jurors,	this	is	not	the	initial	reason	
for	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	 is	 a	 subsequently	 added	
reason	in	the	hearsay	rule’s	rationale.130		
Wigmore’s	belief	in	the	purpose	of	cross-examination	is	premised	on	the	hearsay	rule	first	
appearing	 in	 the	 common	 law	courts,	where	 some	cases	were	 tried	by	 lay	 jurors.	Wigmore’s	
premise	is	undermined	by	subsequent	research,	which	employed	different	methodologies.	J.M.	




127 Ibid. at 303. 
128 Ibid.  
129 Ibid. at 304. 
130 Ibid. 
131 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts of England, 1660-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) at 232-





at	 the	Old	Bailey	allowed	 juries	 to	hear	significant	volumes	of	unsworn	oral	hearsay.	Hearsay	





deemed	 necessary	 is	 not	 attributable	 to	 methodology,	 but	 methodology	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	
answer.	The	 lack	of	opportunity	 for	cross-examination	 is	undoubtedly	a	 factor	that	 led	to	the	









132 Stephan Landsman, “Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England” (1990) 
75 Cornell L Rev 496 [Adversary Procedure]. 
133 Ibid. 







2. The	 threat	 of	 divine	 punishment	 for	 breaking	 the	 oath	 through	 untruthfulness	 was	
thought	to	increase	the	witness’	sincerity.		
3. The	threat	of	earthy	punishment	for	lying	was	believed	to	increase	truthfulness.136		











135 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 261-62. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. at 258. 
139 The Trial of Thomas White alias Whitebread, (1679), 7 Cobb St Tr 311 at 331, cited in Ibid. at 259. 
140 The Trial of Richard Langhorn, esq. at the Old Bailey, for High Treason (1679), 7 Cobb St Tr 417, cited in 
Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 258-59. 



















trier	 of	 fact	 was	 required	 to	make	 factual	 decisions	 on	 unfamiliar	 and	 potentially	 unreliable	





143 R. v. Hebden and Williams (1664), 83 ER 1225 (KB) cited in Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 258-59. 
144 Hearsay’s Reason d’etre, supra note 75 at 259. 
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Aside	 from	reliability	concerns,	 there	 is	a	measure	of	unfairness	 in	allowing	a	party	 to	










The	 fairness	 rationale	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 difficult	 to	 track	 because	 of	 the	 lack	 of	
surviving	 records	 from	the	1600s	and	1700s.	Much	of	 the	 surviving	 records	are	case	 law	and	
judicial	notes	taken	during	trials.	These	records	articulate	judicial	reasoning	in	the	language	of	
reliability.	 There	 are	 no	 empirical	 studies	 of	 judicial	 attitudes	 toward	 hearsay,	 nor	 are	 there	
academic	articles	on	evidentiary	or	epistemological	concerns	with	hearsay.	These	sources	are	
more	likely	to	capture	a	fairness	rationale	for	the	exclusion	of	hearsay.	Although	the	surviving	
records	 do	 not	 explicitly	 discuss	 a	 fairness	 rationale,	 the	 reasoning	 is	 implicitly	 present.	 For	
example,	 as	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.2.3,	 the	 historical	 judicial	 requirement	 for	 demeanour	
evidence	and	cross-examination	of	a	hearsay	statement’s	declarant	is	an	implicit	requirement	of	
																																																						





of	 demeanour	 evidence	 or	 cross-examination,	 they	 were	 implicitly	 voicing	 concern	 that	 the	
declarant	testify	to	prove	his	or	her	hearsay	statement.	As	Ho	recognized,	there	is	an	unfairness	






















The	 study	 found	 that	 the	 participants	 could	 effectively	 weigh	 the	 less	 reliable	 hearsay	
evidence.148	As	triers	of	fact,	they	were	“far	less	satisfied”	with	the	trial	proceeding	when	hearsay	
was	present.149	Their	dissatisfaction	was	specifically	tied	to	the	fairness	in	allowing	the	accused	












147 Sevier, Justin, Popularizing Hearsay (October 2, 2015). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 104, 2016, Forthcoming; 
FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 774. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668760 
[Popularizing Hearsay]. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. at 51. 






What	does	 the	 existence	of	 the	 fairness	 rationale	 in	 this	 research	 tell	 us?	 It	 does	not	
necessarily	 suggest	 that	 the	 fairness	 rationale	 influenced	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	
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152 Ibid. 
153 Mirjan Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997) at 2-3. 



















Using	 the	 five	 factors	 that	gave	 rise	 to	 the	hearsay	 rule’s	historical	 rationale,	 the	 section	will	





	 Section	3.1	will	explain	how	the	current	hearsay	 rule	 is	 constituted	and	operates.	The	
remaining	sections	will	examine	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	and	
its	current	application.	The	analysis	will	proceed	by	reference	to	the	five	factors	that	gave	rise	to	
the	 hearsay	 rule.	 Each	 of	 the	 five	 factors	 exhibit	 problems	 in	 their	 practical	 application	 that	
nuance	 their	 influence	on	 the	decision	 to	 admit	hearsay	evidence.	 This	 thesis	 explores	 those	
problems,	and	uses	them	as	indicia	of	differences	between	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	
and	current	application.	Since	the	five	factors	underlie	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale,	a	












practical	 application,	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 differences	will	 be	 identified	 and	 evaluated.	 In	many	
instances,	the	differences	prevent	the	hearsay	rule	from	achieving	its	purpose.	This	part	of	the	






The	 conduct	 captured	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is	 express	 or	 implied	 verbal	 or	 written	
statements	made	by	a	person	not	called	as	a	witness	at	a	hearing.155	It	is	still	unclear	whether	
implied	non-verbal	 conduct	 is	 captured	by	 the	hearsay	 rule.156	 The	 classic	occasion	on	which	
hearsay	is	prohibited	is	the	testimony	by	a	witness	of	what	a	non-witness	said.	The	hearsay	rule	
also	captures	some	out	of	court	statements	made	by	 the	very	witness	 testifying	 in	court.	For	
																																																						
155 Khelawon, supra note 4 at paras. 56-58. 





There	 are	 two	 features	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 that	 limit	 its	 scope:	 the	 availability	 of	 the	








be	 admitted	 into	 evidence	 if	 it	 fit	 within	 an	 ossified	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 This	
occasionally	 resulted	 in	 the	 stretch	 of	 exceptions	 beyond	 their	 functional	 purpose.161	 In	 the	
1960s,	courts	of	appeal,	including	the	Supreme	Court,	began	to	admit	hearsay	evidence	that	did	
not	 fall	 under	 the	 traditional	 exceptions.162	 This	 foreshadowed	 a	 revolution	 in	 hearsay	
jurisprudence	 that	 began	 in	 earnest	 in	 1990163	 and	 was	 canonized	 in	 the	 2006	 case	 R.	 v.	
Khelawon.164		
																																																						
157 R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 SCR 740; [1993] SCJ No 22 (CanLII) [KGB cited to CanLII]. 
158 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5 at 238. 
159 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 1 per Fish J. 
160 Hill, Tanovich, & Strezos, supra note 12 at 7-5. 
161 See e.g. R. v. Khan, [1988] OJ No 578 (CA). 
162 See. e.g. Omand, v. Alberta Milling Co., [1922] AJ No 63 (CA); J. H. Ashdown Hardware Co. Ltd. v. Singer et al., 
[1951] AJ No 60 (CA); Ares v. Venner, [1970] SCR 608. 
163 R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 SCR 531, 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC) [Khan cited to CanLII]. 






of	 the	 hearsay	 statement’s	 content.	 The	 necessity	 criterion	 serves	 a	 truth-seeking	 function.	
Rather	than	losing	the	evidence	of	an	unavailable	declarant,	the	law	deems	it	necessary	to	admit	
the	evidence	as	an	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule.165.1	If	the	declarant	is	deceased,	ill,	incompetent	
to	 testify,	 or	 otherwise	 unavailable,	 the	 content	 of	 their	 statement	 is	 trapped	 without	 the	
admission	of	hearsay.	Hearsay	evidence	must	be	 ‘necessary’	 in	 this	sense	of	being	trapped	 in	
order	to	be	admissible.	Reliability	is	the	ability	to	negate	the	likelihood	that	the	declarant	of	a	








be	 overcome	by	 strength	 in	 the	 other.169	However,	 even	 if	 a	 hearsay	 statement	 satisfies	 the	
																																																						
165.1 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 49. 
165 R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 SCR 915, 1992 CanLII 79 (SCC) at para. 33 [Smith cited to CanLII]. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 49. 
168 Ibid. at para. 92. 
169 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 72 per Fish J. 
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as	 the	 optimal	 way	 of	 testing	 testimonial	 evidence.	 Because	 hearsay	 evidence	
comes	 in	a	different	 form,	 it	 raises	particular	concerns.	The	general	exclusionary	
rule	is	a	recognition	of	the	difficulty	for	a	trier	of	fact	to	assess	what	weight,	if	any,	
is	to	be	given	to	a	statement	made	by	a	person	who	has	not	been	seen	or	heard,	






from	 the	way	 it	 is	 applied.	 For	 now,	what	 is	 notable	 is	 that	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
rationale	are	present	in	the	text	of	the	jurisprudence.		






170 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 3.  
171 Ibid. at para. 56. 
172 Khan, supra note 163; Smith, supra note 165 at paras. 29-36. 















The	 procedure	 for	 adducing	 hearsay	 evidence	 is	 governed	 by	 a	 series	 of	 evidentiary	
presumptions.	All	hearsay	evidence	is	presumptively	inadmissible.	The	traditional	exceptions	to	
the	hearsay	rule	remain	in	place,	and	a	statement	falling	under	an	exception	is	presumptively	
admissible.	 However,	 the	 presumption	 may	 be	 defeated	 if	 the	 evidence	 falling	 under	 the	
exception	does	not	 satisfy	 the	necessity	 and	 reliability	principle.176	 Indeed,	 an	entire	hearsay	
exception	 can	 be	 judicially	 eliminated	 if	 it	 does	 not	 comply	with	 the	 necessity	 and	 reliability	
																																																						
174 Ibid.  
175 Koch’s scholarship post-dates much of the hearsay revolution. The jurisprudence has not adopted aspects of his 
theory. It has adopted ideas shared by his theory. 





	 The	 new	 long	 road	 that	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 stares	 down	 lies	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 two	




and	 probative	 evidence	 and	 allow	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 to	 decide	 the	weight	 to	 be	 given	 to	 that	
evidence	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	result	which	will	be	just.”178	The	second	is	the	movement	toward	
facilitating	 the	prosecution	of	 sex	and	abuse	crimes	committed	against	children.	As	Professor	
David	 Tanovitch	 notes,	 the	 removal	 of	 gender	 and	 age-based	 stereotypes	 shaped	 the	 then-
nascent	principled	approach	to	hearsay.179	Chief	Justice	McLachlin	reflected	on	this	movement’s	
influence	on	the	hearsay	rule	in	R.	v.	W.J.F.:	
The	 Court's	 decision	 in	 Khan	 to	 permit	 a	 child's	 out-of-court	 statement	 to	 be	







178  R. v. L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 SCR 419, 1993 CanLII 46 (SCC) at para. 50 [LDO cited to CanLII], quoted in David M. 
Tanovitch, “Starr Gazing: Looking into the Future of Hearsay in Canada” (2003) 28 Queen’s LJ 371 at 378-79 
[Starr Gazing]. 
179 Starr Gazing, supra note 178 at 380. 
180 R. v. W.J.F., [1999] 3 SCR 569, [1999] SCJ No 61 (CanLII) at para. 42 [WJF cited to CanLII], quoted in Starr 




prosecution	 bears	 a	 heavy	 burden	 of	 proof.	 They	 were	 motivated	 by	 the	 desire	 to	 more	


















181 Hearsay Dangers, supra note 56. 






It	 has	 taken	 the	 case	 law	 some	 time	 to	 consistently	 identify	 the	 hearsay	 dangers.	
Beginning	in	1993	in	R.	v.	K.G.B.,	the	Supreme	Court	identified	the	hearsay	dangers	as	the	source	









These	 factors	 underlie	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 Inexplicably,	 the	 case	 law	 now	
recognizes	 the	 hearsay	 dangers	 in	Morgan’s	 formulation.186	 The	 factors	 identified	 as	 hearsay	
dangers	previously	are	now	labelled	as	their	own	terms.187		
There	are	two	overlapping	methods	to	allay	the	concern	posed	by	the	hearsay	dangers.	
One	 method	 is	 to	 show	 that	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 hearsay	 statement	 came	 about	
safeguard	against	any	real	concern	about	 the	declarant’s	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	
																																																						
183 Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 31; Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 1. 
184 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 32 
185 R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 SCR 1043, 1996 CanLII 154 (SCC) at para. 60 [Hawkins cited to CanLII]; Starr, supra 
note 182 at para. 160. 
186 See e.g. Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 31. 









Supreme	 Court	 admitted	 the	 child’s	 hearsay	 statement	 to	 her	 mother	 into	 evidence.	 The	
circumstances	in	which	the	statement	was	made	satisfied	the	Court	that	the	child’s	statement	
did	not	suffer	from	difficulties	in	perception,	memory,	narration,	and	sincerity.	The	child	made	
the	 statement	 immediately	 after	 the	 assault,	 eliminating	 any	 concern	 that	 her	memory	 was	
inaccurate.	Being	three	years	old,	she	had	no	motive	to	lie.	Her	statement	was	made	naturally	
and	 without	 prompting,	 suggesting	 that	 her	 mother	 did	 not	 coax	 her	 into	 making	 the	








188 Khan, supra note 163. 





and	 the	 statement	 did	 not	 pose	 a	 risk	 of	 misevaluation	 in	 jurors	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 cross-









required	test	 [i.e.,	 cross-examination]	would	add	 little	as	a	security,	
because	its	purposes	had	been	already	substantially	accomplished.	If	








was	 the	 best	 method	 to	 expose	 frailties	 in	 testimonial	 evidence	 to	 lay	 jurors.	 The	 locus	 of	
Wigmore’s	concern	was	lay	jurors’	ability	to	evaluate	the	reliability	of	hearsay.		
																																																						
190 Wigmore, supra note 13 at vol. I, p. 27, §1367. 
191 Ibid. at p. 1791, §1420 cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 92 
192 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 62. 
193 Unlike Wigmore, however, the jurisprudence will not allow for an exception to the hearsay rule on the basis of a 
non-contemporaneous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of a hearsay statement (Hawkins, supra note 185 
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ought	 to	 have	 been	 excluded	 from	 evidence.	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 for	 Ontario	 held	 that	 the	
confidential	informants’	information	was	admissible	under	the	hearsay	rule.197	Though	hearsay,	
the	 information	 was	 necessary	 because	 the	 confidential	 informants	 could	 not	 be	 called	 as	
witnesses.	 The	 information	was	 sufficiently	 reliable	 because	 the	 informants	 had	 a	 history	 of	
providing	accurate	and	truthful	information	to	the	police.		
Clearly,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 was	 comfortable	 with	 the	 veracity	 of	 the	 informants’	
information.	 This	 was	 only	 part	 of	 the	 equation,	 though,	 and	 the	 Court	 should	 have	 looked	
further.	More	relevant	was	the	expert’s	actual	opinion	–	and	how	he	derived	that	opinion	from	
the	 information	 available	 to	 him.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 ought	 to	 have	 treated	
demeanour	evidence	as	critical.	The	informants	were	unlikely	to	be	savory	characters.	They	were	
confidential	informants,	with	a	history	of	speaking	to	the	police,	who	chose	to	disclose	gang	ties	
about	 an	 accused	 murderer.	 These	 are	 not	 the	 type	 of	 people	 who	 look	 trustworthy	 in	 a	
courtroom,	and	they	are	not	known	for	being	careful	with	their	words.	The	trier	of	fact,	in	this	
																																																						
196 R. v. Sheriffe, 2015 ONCA 880, [2015] OJ No 6609. 
197 Ibid. at para. 120. 
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case	 a	 jury,	 should	 have	 been	 able	 to	 see	 the	 informants	 testify	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	
expert’s	opinion	was	credible	in	light	of	having	based	his	opinion	on	their	information.	Even	if	the	














not	 want	 to	 go	 to	 court.	 The	 witness’	 statement	 is	 not	 sworn	 and	 is	 both	 confirmed	 and	






this	 is	 evidence	 necessary	 to	 secure	 a	 conviction.	 This	 factual	 situation	 happened	 in	 R.	 v.	








Returning	 to	 the	methods	 of	 allaying	 the	 concern	 posed	 by	 the	 hearsay	 dangers,	 the	
second	method	is	to	show	that	there	are	adequate	substitutes	to	test	the	truth	and	accuracy	of	
the	hearsay	 statement.200	The	classic	example	 is	when	a	 statement	 is	made	at	another	 court	





to	 testify	 at	 trial	 as	 a	 Crown	witness.	 At	 the	 trial	 the	 Crown	 sought	 to	 admit	 the	 girlfriend’s	
preliminary	inquiry	testimony	under	the	principled	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule.	The	Supreme	
																																																						
198 R. v. Groves, 2011 BCSC 1935, [2013] BCJ No 2258 affirm’d in 2013 BCCA 446. 
199 Ibid.  
200 Khelawon, supra note 4 at 63. 
201 Hawkins, supra note 185. 
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application.	 While	 the	 jurisprudence	 has	 taken	 some	 time	 to	 correctly	 identify	 the	 hearsay	
dangers,	 the	 test	 for	 threshold	 reliability	 is	 premised	 on	 testing	 for	 them.	 The	 hearsay	 rule	








during	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	 rule.	 The	 influence	 of	 demeanour	 evidence	 on	 the	
admission	 of	 hearsay	 is	 substantial,	 though	 it	 is	 sometimes	 subsumed	 by	 the	 role	 of	 cross-
																																																						
202 Ibid. at 76. 
203 Ibid. at para. 77. 
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examination.	 Though	 initially	 labeled	a	hearsay	danger,	demeanour	evidence	 is	 characterized	
today	as	an	independent	factor	in	the	test	for	threshold	reliability.		




questions,	hesitation,	degree	of	 commitment	 to	 the	 statement	being	made,	etc.	
Most	 importantly,	 and	 subsuming	 all	 of	 these	 factors,	 the	 trier	 can	 assess	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 interviewer	 and	 the	witness	 to	 observe	 the	 extent	 to	
which	the	testimony	of	the	witness	is	the	product	of	the	investigator's	questioning.	
Such	 subtle	 observations	 and	 cues	 cannot	 be	 gleaned	 from	a	 transcript,	 read	 in	















204 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 97. 
205.1 See especially Hawkins, supra note 185 at para. 77. 




The	 jurisprudence	 has	 gone	 so	 far	 as	 to	 outline	 potential	methods	 of	 preserving	 demeanour	
evidence	when	taking	a	statement	so	that	the	statement	can	be	admitted	as	an	exception	to	the	
hearsay	rule	 if	 the	declarant	becomes	unavailable	 to	 testify.	The	statement	can	be	video	and	
audio	recorded	or,	in	exceptional	cases,	an	independent	third	party	can	observe	the	making	of	
the	statement	and	testify	about	the	declarant’s	demeanour.206	
	 The	 case	 law	 has	 generally	 endorsed	 the	 value	 of	 demeanour	 evidence	 in	 relation	 to	






against	 strong	 reliance	 on	 demeanour	 evidence.	 In	 2015	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 for	 Ontario	







206 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 101. 
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fact	 to	determine	how	certain	or	honest	 the	declarant	 is	 attempting	 to	be.	Nonetheless,	 the	
jurisprudence	has	long	held	to	Wigmore’s	belief	that	cross-examination	is	the	best	method	for	
discovering	 the	 truth.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 a	 hearsay	 statement’s	




addition	 she	 provided	 her	 statement	 under	 oath	 and	 there	 was	 a	 court	 transcript	 of	 her	
testimony.		




does	not	 always	occur	 anymore.	Due	 to	 technological	 advancements,	 there	 are	 two	 types	of	






206.1 R. v. N.S., 2012 SCC 72, [2012] 3 SCR 726, at para. 25 [NS cited to SCC]. 
206.2 R. v. Rhayel, 2015 ONCA 377 at para. 89, [2015] O.J. No. 2675 [Rhayel cited to ONCA]. 
206.3 See e.g. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Neinstein (2010), 99 OR (3d) 1 (CA) at para. 66. 




giving	 the	evidence	will	 be	 lost.	 This	 is	 not	 an	uncommon	occurrence.	 It	 happens	every	 time	
hearsay	 is	 admitted	 because	 a	 witness	 testified	 at	 a	 preliminary	 inquiry	 or	 non-videoed	










answers,	 demeanour,	 and	 weighs	 accordingly.	 The	 information	 from	 this	 fluid	 interaction	 is	
absent	 if	 a	 written	 hearsay	 statement	 is	 admitted	 due	 to	 non-contemporaneous	 cross-




208 N.S., supra note 206.1 at para. 27. The Supreme Court made this ruling notwithstanding that that no expert evidence 
was put before the Court on the importance of seeing a witness’s face to effective cross-examination and accurate 
assessment of a witness’s credibility (para. 17). 













when	 it	 became	 a	 late	 justification	 for	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 It	 is	 complicated	 in	 practice	 by	 the	
disjunction	between	its	theoretical	role	in	hearsay	jurisprudence	and	its	application	in	criminal	
hearings.	 Due	 to	 this	 disjunction,	 the	 truth	 gathering	 function	 of	 cross-examination	 may	 be	
overstated;	or	it	may	be	stated	correctly	and	practiced	differently	by	criminal	defence	lawyers.	












reason	of	 the	declarant's	death	or	 some	other	cause	 rendering	him	
now	 unavailable	 as	 a	 witness	 on	 the	 stand,	 we	 are	 faced	with	 the	
alternatives	of	receiving	his	statements	without	that	test,	or	of	leaving	
his	knowledge	altogether	unutilized.	The	question	arises	whether	the	
interests	 of	 truth	 would	 suffer	 more	 by	 adopting	 the	 latter	 or	 the	
former	alternative	 ...	 .	 [I]t	 is	 clear	 at	 least	 that,	 so	 far	 as	 in	 a	 given	
instance	some	substitute	for	cross-examination	is	found	to	have	been	
present,	 there	 is	 ground	 for	 making	 an	 exception.	 [Emphasis	 in	
original.]	
	




required	test	 [i.e.,	 cross-examination]	would	add	 little	as	a	security,	
because	its	purposes	had	been	already	substantially	accomplished.	If	






reliable	 for	 admission,	 the	 ability	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 is	 acutely	 important	 when	
reliance	 is	 placed	on	 the	 latter,	 the	use	of	 adequate	 substitutes	 for	 contemporaneous	 cross-
examination.211	 Non-contemporaneous	 cross-examination	 goes	 a	 long	 way	 to	 satisfying	 the	
reliability	requirement.212	When	considering	the	admissibility	of	prior	inconsistent	statements	for	
example,	 the	 ability	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 is	 the	most	 important	 factor	 supporting	
																																																						
210 Smith, supra note 165 at para. 29. 
211 Khelawon, supra note 4 at paras. 62-63. 










It	 is	 another	 instance	 of	 the	 Court	 selectively	 choosing	 from	Wigmore’s	 scholarship	 on	 the	
hearsay	rule.	Wigmore	believed	that,	historically	and	currently,	cross-examination	of	a	hearsay	
statement’s	declarant	is	necessary	to	prevent	lay	jurors	from	overvaluing	the	statement.217	Cross-











213 Ibid. at para. 35. 
214 KGB, supra note 157. 
215 R. v. U. (F.J.), [1995] 3 SCR 764, 1995 CanLII 74 (SCC) [FJU cited to CanLII]. 
216 Khelawon, supra note 4 at paras. 61-64. 
217 Koch, supra note 13 at 90-94. 
218 Wigmore, supra note 13 at vol. III, p. 154, §1420. 
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There	 is	 congruence	 in	 the	 role	 cross-examination	 played	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	 rationale	 and	 the	 role	 assigned	 to	 it	 in	 the	 current	 jurisprudence.	According	 to	 the	








to	 the	 Supreme	Court,	 there	may	be	 “no	other	way	 to	 expose	 falsehood,	 to	 rectify	 error,	 to	
correct	 distortion	 or	 to	 elicit	 vital	 information	 that	 would	 otherwise	 remain	 forever	
																																																						
219 Starr, supra note 182 at para. 30 [citations omitted]. 
220 Starr, supra note 182 at para. 159. 
221 Baldree, supra note 156. 
222 R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595, [1993] SCJ No 135 (CanLII) at para. 157 [Osolin cited to CanLII]. 
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concealed.”223	 While	 the	 historical	 hearsay	 rule	 privileged	 cross-examination,	 there	 is	 no	
indication	 that	 it	 did	 so	 to	 such	an	extent.	 The	 jurisprudence	 is	more	 in	 line	with	Wigmore’s	
profound	faith	in	cross-examination.		
	 The	practical	role	of	cross-examination	in	criminal	law	is	broader.	In	criminal	practice,	the	
goal	 of	 the	 cross-examining	defence	 counsel	 is	 to	 raise	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	 on	 the	 evidence.	
Though	not	 formally	 recognized,	 considerations	other	 than	 the	 reliability	of	 the	evidence	are	
employed	in	criminal	practice	to	raise	a	reasonable	doubt.	There	is	tremendous	overlap	between	
the	reliability	of	the	evidence	and	raising	a	reasonable	doubt;	but	the	overlap	is	not	perfect.	The	
difference	 between	 the	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 roles	 of	 cross-exemption	 allow	 an	 accused	
person	 to	 cross-examine	 on	 considerations	 broader	 than	 reliability.	When	 this	 occurs,	 cross-
examination	takes	on	epistemic	and	practical	qualities	that	are	beyond	the	scope	of	testing	the	




to	 the	 court.	 The	witness	may	 suffer	 from	 crippling	 anxiety	 or	 be	 unfamiliar	with	 courtroom	
procedure	or	unclear	about	what	details	they	ought	to	include	in	their	testimony.	All	of	these	
difficulties	are	unrelated	to	the	reliability	of	the	witness’	evidence.	Nonetheless,	a	skilled	cross-
examiner	 is	 duty	bound	 to	expose	 these	difficulties	 in	 cross-examination,	 if	 it	 is	 in	his	or	her	
client’s	best	interest,	to	convince	the	trier	of	fact	to	not	rely	on	the	witness’	evidence.	The	cross-
																																																						





In	 terms	of	 practical	 qualities,	 a	witness	may	be	quick	 to	 anger	or	 have	 an	otherwise	
unpleasant	disposition.	For	example,	they	may	be	a	gang	member	distrustful	of	the	police,	court	
process,	and	trier	of	fact.	The	accused	person’s	lawyer	may	choose	to	cross-examine	in	a	manner	
that	 brings	 out	 the	witness’	 unfavourable	 personality,	 tying	 their	 distasteful	 character	 to	 the	
reliability	of	 their	evidence.	Trials	are	a	human	process.	The	 trier	of	 fact	may	be	unwilling	 to	
believe	the	witness’	evidence	despite	whatever	veracity	it	may	possess.		
Perhaps	most	poignant	in	terms	of	practical	qualities	is	the	occasion	on	which	a	witness’	
evidence	 is	acutely	 tied	 to	 their	 credibility.224	Granted,	 reliability	 is	always	 implicated	when	a	
witness’	 credibility	 is	 questioned.	 Reliability	 becomes	 divorced	 from	 credibility	 when	 cross-
examination	focuses	the	trier	of	 facts’	attention	on	the	witness’	character	 to	the	exclusion	of	
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Did	 Radler	 have	 to	 testify	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 convicted	 Black	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 his	 plea	
agreement	 with	 the	 prosecution?	 Would	 Radler’s	 observations,	 unadulterated,	 produce	
																																																						
227 Ibid. at 116-117. 
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upon	 Radler’s	 testimony.228	 Surely	 this	 is	 not	 what	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 had	 in	mind	when	 it	





must	be	to	raise	a	reasonable	doubt.	The	role	 is	 laudable;	the	disjunction	between	 it	and	the	
theoretical	role	of	cross-examination	is	the	problem.	The	hearsay	jurisprudence	assumes	that	an	




doubt	 through	 cross-examination	were	 present	when	 the	 hearsay	 rule	was	 developed	 in	 the	
1600s	 and	 1700s.	 Cross-examination	 was	 a	 relatively	 late	 justification	 for	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
development,	post-dating	concerns	with	absence	of	an	oath	and	demeanour	evidence.231	The	
																																																						
228 Ibid. at 117. 
229 Osolin, supra note 225 at para. 157 per Cory J. 
230 Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, Toronto: LSUC, 2016, R 4.01(1) [Rules].  













Confrontation	 in	 treason	 trials	 suggests	 a	 right	 to	 cross-examine	 for	 the	purpose	of	 raising	 a	







epistemic	 and	 practical	 qualities	 in	 raising	 a	 reasonable	 doubt	were	 not	 present	 -	 there	 is	 a	
																																																						
232 Bathurst, supra note 123, cited in Koch, supra note 13 at 236. 
233 Friedman, supra note 46 at 97. 
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difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 current	 application.	
Contemporaneous	cross-examination	is	deemed	important	in	the	historical	and	current	hearsay	
jurisprudence	because	of	its	ability	to	shed	light	on	the	hearsay	dangers.	In	practice,	however,	





Like	 demeanour	 evidence,	 the	 absence	 of	 sworn	 evidence	 remains	 one	 of	 the	 core	
concepts	of	the	hearsay	rule.	It	was	previously	identified	as	a	‘hearsay	danger’	and	is	now	labelled	
as	its	own	factor.	
	 The	 role	 of	 sworn	 evidence	 has	 changed	with	 the	 times.	 Gone	 is	 the	 suggestion	 that	
supernatural	 retribution	 will	 follow	 if	 a	 witness	 lies	 under	 oath.234	 The	 spectre	 of	 such	
punishment	remains	a	consequence	of	the	oath	for	some	witnesses,	but	it	is	no	longer	part	of	
the	 the	 oath’s	 philosophical	 significance.	 Rather,	 like	 the	 solemn	 affirmation,	 the	 oath’s	
significance	is	 its	 impression	upon	the	witness	of	the	moral	obligation	to	tell	the	truth.235	The	
oath	and	 solemn	affirmation	are	 court	procedures	 that	augment	 the	 reliability	of	 testimonial	
evidence.	They	are	employed	to	aid	the	trier	of	fact	in	arriving	at	the	correct	decision.	
																																																						
234 KGB, supra note 157 at para. 86. 











the	 threat	 of	 state	 punishment	 is	 a	 far	 greater	 influence	 on	 the	 truthfulness	 of	 a	 witness’	
statement	than	the	moral	obligation	to	tell	the	truth.	
	 So	 important	 is	 sworn	 evidence	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 that	 it	 is	 almost	 a	 necessary	
requirement	for	the	admission	of	prior	inconsistent	statements.	In	K.G.B.	the	Supreme	Court	held	
that	the	oath	and	solemn	affirmation	augment	the	reliability	of	a	statement	to	such	an	extent	
that,	 all	 things	being	equal,	 their	 absence	 in	 a	prior	 inconsistent	 statement	 strongly	 suggests	





236 Ibid. at para. 89. 
237 KGB, supra note 157. 
238 Ibid at para. 90. 





















evidence	 without	 giving	 that	 party	 the	 chance	 to	 remove	 the	 prejudice	 caused	 by	 that	
																																																						
240 Ibid. at para. 94. 
241 Ibid. at para. 96 
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evidence.242	 These	 two	 types	 of	 unfairness	 primarily	 comprise	 the	 factor	 ‘fairness	 in	 the	
adversarial	process.’		
Fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	is	one	of	three	aspects	of	the	hearsay	rule’s	historical	
rationale	 and	 remains	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 current	 application	 of	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 The	 test	 for	
threshold	reliability	aims	to	attenuate	the	two	types	of	unfairness	inherent	in	admitting	hearsay	
evidence.	However,	the	test’s	 influence	is	affected	by	changes	in	 litigation	procedure.	 Indeed,	





they	 were	 subject	 to	 an	 oath	 or	 affirmation,	 cross-examination,	 and	 observation	 by	 the	 the	
adverse	 party,	 judge,	 and,	 potentially,	 lay	 jurors.	 In	 determining	 the	 admissibility	 of	 hearsay	
evidence,	courts	are	concerned	with	whether	the	hearsay	statement	exhibits	sufficient	indicia	of	
reliability	 so	 as	 to	 afford	 the	 trier	 of	 fact	 “a	 satisfactory	basis	 for	 evaluating	 the	 truth	of	 the	
statement."243	This	is	the	test	for	threshold	reliability,	and	it	is	supposed	to	minimize	unfairness	




242 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 410. 
243 Baldree, supra note 156 at 83, quoting Hawkins, supra note 185 at para. 75. 
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of	 fact	 to	determine.	Hence	 if	a	declarant	 testifies	at	a	preliminary	 inquiry	 that	 she	saw	“the	
accused	and	an	alien	kill	the	victim	with	a	spaceship”,	and	the	declarant	cannot	be	found	at	trial,	




While	 this	 may	 make	 sense	 in	 isolation,	 in	 modern	 criminal	 trials	 it	 can	 exacerbate	
unfairness.	There	are	sub-proceedings	in	criminal	trials	where	evidence	is	not	weighed.	The	sub-










is	 evidence	 upon	 which	 a	 jury	 acting	 reasonably	 could	 convict	 the	 accused	 person.244	 One	
purpose	of	the	preliminary	inquiry	is	to	screen	out	charges	for	which	the	prosecution	does	not	
																																																						
244 United States of America v. Shephard, [1977] 2 SCR 1067. 
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have	 any	 evidence	 that	 could	 result	 in	 a	 conviction.	 The	 evidence	 is	 not	 weighed	 by	 the	
preliminary	 inquiry	 judge.	Every	 inference	 in	the	evidence	 is	taken	at	 its	highest	to	afford	the	
opportunity	to	commit	the	accused	person	to	trial,	where	he	or	she	can	be	judged	in	full	by	a	
trier	 of	 fact.245	 These	 conditions	 can	 set	 up	 a	 perfect	 storm	 of	 unfairness,	 one	which	 is	 not	
uncommon	in	Canadian	courtrooms.	A	hypothetical	illustrates	the	point:	A	completely	fanciful	
and	untrue	hearsay	statement	is	tendered	at	a	preliminary	inquiry.	The	declarant	does	not	attend	
and	 the	 statement	 meets	 the	 test	 for	 threshold	 reliability.	 The	 hearsay	 statement	 will	 be	
admitted	into	evidence	and	deemed	true.	Assume	that	the	hearsay	statement	is	the	lynchpin	for	
the	prosecution,	giving	it	enough	evidence	to	commit	the	accused	person	to	trial.	There	is	a	great	
deal	 of	 unfairness	 here.	 The	 prosecution	 is	 permitted	 to	 tender	 a	 statement	 that	 the	 court	







justice	 system	 would	 have	 been	 at	 an	 end,	 barring	 the	 exceptional	 use	 of	 a	 preferred	
indictment.246	
																																																						
245 R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001] 2 SCR 828 [Arcuri cited to SCC]. 








reasonably	 could	 convict	 the	accused	person?248	 Every	 inference	available	on	 the	evidence	 is	





Apply	 the	 previously	 discussed	 hypothetical	 into	 the	 context	 of	 a	 directed	 verdict	
application.	 A	 completely	 fanciful	 and	 untrue	 hearsay	 statement	 is	 admitted	 during	 the	






247 A Theory of Hearsay, supra note 62 at 410. 













the	 adverse	 party	 on	 the	 same	 issues	 will	 be	 sufficient	 to	 satisfy	 the	 test	 for	 threshold	
reliability.249	Driving	admissibility	is	the	adverse	party’s	ability	to	cross-examine	the	declarant.	In	
almost	all	 instances,	the	cross-examining	party	 in	a	preliminary	 inquiry	 is	 the	accused	person.	
Litigation	procedure	may	cause	the	accused	person’s	litigation	strategy	to	change	between	the	
preliminary	 inquiry	and	 trial.	 The	cross-examination	conducted	at	 the	preliminary	 inquiry	will	
serve	a	purpose	different	 than	cross-examination	at	 trial.	However,	 if	 the	declarant	does	not	
attend	 the	 trial,	 the	 accused	person	will	 be	unable	 to	 implement	 the	new	 cross-examination	
strategy.	 Instead,	 the	 accused	 person	 will	 be	 stuck	 with	 the	 cross-examination	 from	 the	
preliminary	inquiry.		
																																																						





believes	 that	 they	 can	 be	 discharged	 on	 the	weaker	 charges	 through	 cross-examination.	 The	
accused	person	may	choose	 to	cross-examine	 the	declarant	extensively	on	 the	subject	of	 the	
weaker	charges	in	the	hope	of	obtaining	a	discharge.	The	witness’	evidence	on	the	other	charges	
will	be	left	unchallenged,	saving	the	surprise	of	cross-examination	on	these	issues	for	the	trial.	
The	 tactic	 is	 a	 strategic	 one.	 It	 assumes,	 fairly,	 that	 the	 witness	 will	 be	 available	 for	 cross-
examination	at	trial.	If	the	witness’	evidence	is	admitted	at	trial	under	the	hearsay	rule,	however,	






























to	 cross-examine	 the	 eyewitness	 at	 the	 preliminary	 inquiry.	 In	 reality,	 that	 opportunity	 is	
hollowed	by	X’s	guilty	plea	and	anticipated	testimony.		
The	 same	 dynamic	 can	 occur	 when	multiple	 accused	 persons	 are	 tried	 together	 at	 a	
preliminary	inquiry	and	severed	in	prosecution	before	the	trial.	The	accused	persons	will	share	a	
preliminary	 inquiry	but	not	share	a	 trial.	Often,	 the	prosecution	decides	 to	sever	 the	accused	
																																																						
250 Cudmore, supra note 2 at 107. 
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parties	before	 the	 trial	 so	 that	 they	 can	be	 compelled	 to	 testify	 against	one	another	 at	 each	
other’s	respective	trials.	The	anticipated	testimony	of	the	severed	accused	party	can	change	each	
defendant’s	 cross-examination	 strategy	 of	 the	 witnesses	 from	 the	 preliminary	 inquiry.	 The	
example	of	the	‘shotgun	eyewitness’	is	applicable	to	this	situation,	as	is	the	resulting	unfairness.	
If	a	witness	from	the	preliminary	inquiry	cannot	be	found	at	the	time	of	trial,	the	accused	person	
will	 be	 unable	 to	 initiate	 his	 or	 her	 new	 cross-examination	 strategy.	 Instead,	 the	 hearsay	
jurisprudence	will	deem	the	accused	person	 to	have	applied	 their	 strategy	at	 the	preliminary	












251 Criminal Code, RSC 1985. c C-46, s. 715(1) 




it	does	not	consider	 the	necessity	and	 reliability	principle	 to	determine	admissibility.	Hearsay	
evidence	falling	within	s.	715(1)	is	automatically	admitted	into	evidence.	In	this	respect,	it	is	an	
exception	to	the	hearsay	rule	that	operates	differently	than	the	common	law	exceptions.	The	





	In	 summary,	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process	 remains	 an	 underlying	 factor	 in	 the	
current	application	of	the	hearsay	rule.	The	test	for	threshold	reliability	aims	to	attenuate	the	





unfairness	 exists	 due	 to	 criminal	 litigation	 procedures	 that	 change	 the	 strategy	 of	 cross-
examination	for	accused	parties.		
This	section	has	used	the	 lens	of	the	five	factors	that	underlie	hearsay	rule’s	historical	



















in	 admitting	 hearsay	 evidence.	 A	 third	 type	 of	 unfairness	 exists	 due	 to	 criminal	 litigation	
procedures	that	change	the	strategy	of	cross-examination	for	accused	parties.	

















discussion	will	occur	only	 for	exceptions	 for	which	 there	 is	a	difference	between	 the	hearsay	
rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 their	 practical	 application.	 The	 exceptions	 are:	 admissions,	 res	







253 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5. 
254 Hill, Tanovich, & Strezos, supra note 12. 
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principle.255	Moreover,	 an	exception	 to	 the	hearsay	 rule	 can	be	 challenged	 to	determine	 if	 it	
conforms	to	the	necessity	and	reliability	principle.256		
What	follows	is	an	analysis	of	the	following	hearsay	exceptions:	admissions,	res	gestae,	









trial	 by	 the	 opposing	 party.257	 Hearsay	 is	 governed	 by	 the	 necessity	 and	 reliability	 principle.	
Though	characterized	as	hearsay	evidence,	admissions	are	excepted	from	the	hearsay	rule	for	a	
different	reason.	Admissions	are	accepted	under	a	theory	of	the	adversarial	system	which	holds	
that	 a	party	 cannot	 complain	of	 their	 own	 statement’s	 unreliability.258	 The	declarant	party	 is	
presumed	to	have	satisfied	him	or	herself	of	the	statement’s	reliability	upon	utterance	of	the	
																																																						
255 Khelawon, supra note 4 at para. 42. 
256 Ibid. 
257 R. v. Foreman (2002), 62 OR (3d) 204 (Ont CA) at 215-216 [Foreman]. 
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261 See e.g. R. v. Matte, 2012 ONCA 504, [2012] OJ No 3327 [Matte] 
262 R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 SCR 3 [Oickle cited to SCC]. 









enjoy	 a	 right	 to	 silence.	 The	 right	 only	 became	 recognized	 in	 earnest	 in	 1848,	well	 after	 the	
hearsay	rule	crystallized.265	The	hearsay	rule’s	historical	rationale	does	not	contemplate	strategic	
decisions	by	accused	persons	 to	 testify	 to	 remove	 the	prejudice	caused	by	hearsay	evidence.	
Rather,	that	decision	is	assumed.		
In	practice	the	decision	to	testify	and	expose	oneself	to	cross-examination	is	one	of	the	








264 Ibid. at 410. 
265 Christopher Sherrini, “The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Regulatory Proceedings: Beginnings (That 
Never Began)” (2004) 30 Man. L.J. 315 – 352 [Privilege Against Self-Incrimination]. 










hearsay	 voir	 dire	 poses	 problems.	 The	 accused	 person	 is	 open	 to	 a	 broad	 right	 of	 cross-
examination	that	can	reveal	strategic	information	about	his	or	her	defence.	In	all,	the	calculus	
determining	whether	to	testify	often	results	in	accused	persons	remaining	silent.		
The	 calculus	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 ease	 with	 which	 admissions	 are	 admitted	 under	 the	
exception.	Small	details	of	evidence	are	readily	admitted.	The	details	are	relevant	to	the	case	but	
not	 important	 enough	 to	 justify	 the	 risk	 of	 testifying.	 For	 example,	 a	 member	 of	 a	 criminal	
organization	may	be	charged	with	conspiracy	to	commit	drug	and	gun	offences	after	having	his	
phone	wiretapped	for	a	number	of	weeks.	At	trial	the	prosecution	will	use	the	wiretapped	calls	
as	 evidence	 of	 the	 accused	 person’s	 criminal	 acts.	 In	 doing	 so,	 the	 prosecution	will	 need	 to	
























	 Three	 subcategories	 comprise	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule.	 They	 are	
declarations	 of	 bodily	 and	 mental	 findings	 and	 conditions,	 declarations	 accompanying	 and	
																																																						







which	 a	 hearsay	 statement	 is	 created.	 The	 res	 gestae	 exception	 as	 a	whole	 presumes	 that	 a	
statement	made	with	relative	contemporaneity	to	an	event	or	feeling	will	allay	against	two	of	the	
four	hearsay	dangers.269	The	declarant’s	memory	will	be	 fresh	and	 there	will	be	 little	 time	to	
concoct	an	 insincere	statement.270	These	factors	compensate	for	the	statement’s	 lack	of	oath	
and	 demeanour	 evidence,	 and	 inability	 to	 contemporaneously	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant,	
giving	the	statement	sufficient	reliability	for	admission.	




hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 Central	 to	 this	 diminished	 influence	 is	 the	 conflation	 that	
contemporaneity	between	an	event	or	feeling	and	a	statement	results	in	reliability.	It	does	not.	
At	 best	 it	 results	 in	 a	 sincere	 statement.271	 Sincerity	 may	 on	 occasion	 overlap	 neatly	 with	
reliability,	but	reliability	encompasses	more	than	sincerity.	Cross-examination	is	needed	to	prod	
the	declarant’s	perception	of	 the	event	or	 feeling	and	what	 they	meant	when	they	said	 their	
																																																						
268 See e.g. Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5 at 332.	
269 Ibid. 
270 Kevin P. Doyle, The “New Approach” to the Admission of Hearsay Evidence (LLM Thesis, University of Alberta 
Faculty of Law, 1994) [unpublished] at 73-105. 
271 Ibid. at 77 
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statement.	 Through	 these	 avenues	 of	 questioning,	 the	 adverse	 party	 and	 trier	 of	 fact	 can	
determine	if	the	declarant’s	sincere	statement	is	true.		




their	 bodily	 condition	 because	 they	 are	 contemporaneously	 experiencing	 it,	 and	 they	 are	
experiencing	the	bodily	condition	because	they	are	speaking	about	it.272	Declarations	of	bodily	
condition	require	cross-examination	and	an	oath	to	guard	against	insincerity.		
The	contemporaneity	 that	allows	 the	declarant’s	memory	of	an	event	or	 feeling	 to	be	
accurate	may	also	disallow	the	declarant	from	properly	narrating	their	statement.	The	result	is	a	
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273 The example is adopted from the hypothetical in Tanovitch, supra note 178 at 405. 
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require	 the	 accused	person	 to	 tender	 evidence	 to	 rebut	 its	 prejudice.	 The	only	 guarantee	of	











In	 all,	 the	 presumption	 in	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 that	 reliability	 is	 derived	 from	
contemporaneity	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	opportunity	to	




274 R. v. Shea, 2011 NSCA 107, [2011] NSJ No 653 at paras. 69-75 [Shea]. 
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sincerity	 and	 reliability.	 Cross-examination	 and	 an	 oath	 are	 needed	 to	 carefully	 explore	 the	
declarant’s	 perception	 of	what	 caused	 their	 injury	 and	what	 they	meant	 by	 their	 statement.	
Sincerity	is	a	concern	as	well.	Dying	men	and	women	do	not	lose	their	ability	to	lie.280		
The	 dying	 declaration	 exception	 is	 still	 applied	 in	 practice.281	 Increasingly,	 though,	




277 Bryant, Lederman & Fuerst, supra note 5 at 358-359. 
278 R. v. Jurtyn, [1958] OJ No 229 (CA) [Jurtyn]. 
279 Doyle, supra note 273 at 65. 
280 This expression is adapted from Baldree, supra note 156 at para. 115 
281 See e. g. R. v. Muise, 2013 NSSC 141, [2013] NSJ No 290 [Muise]. 




The	 co-conspirators	 exception	 is	 applied	 mainly	 (but	 not	 exclusively)283	 in	 criminal	
conspiracy	 cases.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 justifies	 the	 exception	 in	 large	 part	 on	 the	 need	 to	
prosecute	conspiracy	charges.	 In	R.	v.	Mapara	the	Court	candidly	admitted	that	depriving	the	
prosecution	 “of	 the	 right	 to	 use	double	 hearsay	 evidence	of	 co-conspirators	 as	 to	what	 they	
variously	 said	 in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy	would	mean	 that	 serious	criminal	 conspiracies	
would	often	go	unpunished.”284	While	there	are	many	criticisms	of	the	co-conspirators	exception,	















283 See. e.g. the facts of R. v. Dieckmann, 2014 ONSC 717, [2013] OJ No 6154 [Dieckmann]. 
284 Mapara, supra note 176 at para. 29. 
285 R. v. Chang, [2003] OJ No 1076 (CanLII) at para. 53 [Chang], quoting R. v. Barrow,	[1987] 2 SCR 694, [1987] 
SCJ No 84 (CanLII) at para. 73 [Barrow cited to CanLII]. 
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the	evidence	 that	 is	 directly	 admissible	 against	 the	 accused	and	decide	on	a	















Without	 this	 finding,	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	 rule	 falls	 away.	 Co-conspirators	 are	 held	
responsible	 for	 each	 other’s	words	 and	 acts	 on	 the	 premise	 that,	 in	 agreeing	 to	 engage	 in	 a	
common	design,	co-conspirators	have	agreed	to	act	as	each	other’s	agents.286	A	co-conspirator’s	
statements	are	also	effectively	part	of	 the	actus	 reus	 of	 the	offence	of	 conspiracy.	Once	 it	 is	






286 Chang, supra note 288 at paras. 55 & 82-84. 











	 Nevertheless,	 in	Ontario	 there	 is	no	need	 to	prove	 that	an	alleged	 co-conspirator	 is	 a	
probable	 member	 of	 the	 conspiracy	 before	 that	 person’s	 words	 and	 acts	 can	 be	 used	 to	
incriminate	the	accused	person.290	 In	R.	v.	Farinacci	 the	Court	of	Appeal	 for	Ontario	curiously	
reasoned	that	the	co-conspirators	exception	possesses	sufficient	reliability	from	the	requirement	
that	 the	only	statements	considered	are	 those	made	 in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy.291	This	
reasoning	misunderstands	threshold	reliability	under	the	co-conspirators	exception.	Anyone	can	
make	a	 statement	 in	 furtherance	of	a	conspiracy.	What	matters,	and	what	gives	a	 statement	
threshold	reliability,	is	that	the	statement	made	in	furtherance	of	the	conspiracy	 is	made	by	a	




288 Ibid at paras. 116-117 
289 Ibid. 
290 R. v. Farinacci, 2015 ONCA 392 [Farinacci]. 












probable	member	 of	 the	 conspiracy.	 The	 facts	 of	 Farinacci	 are	 instructive.293	 Lucas	 and	 Len	










292 Chang, supra note 288 at para. 55 















The	 presumption	 in	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 that	 reliability	 is	 derived	 from	
contemporaneity	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	opportunity	to	
cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 to	 wield	 less	 influence	 than	 they	 did	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale.	
Like	the	res	gestae	exception,	dying	declarations	are	premised	on	a	conflation	between	







exceptions	 and	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 are	 applicable	 to	 the	 co-conspirators	













dangers,	 demeanour	 evidence,	 the	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 to	 cross-examine	 the	 declarant,	 the	
evidence	 is	 unsworn,	 and	 fairness	 in	 the	 adversarial	 process.	 The	 six	 major	 theories	 in	 the	
literature	describe	aspects	of	the	same	historical	rationale.	Methodological	differences	between	
the	theories	and	deficiencies	within	them	cause	them	to	capture	only	a	portion	of	the	hearsay	
rule’s	 historical	 rationale.	 The	 only	 debate	within	 the	 literature	 that	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	
methodological	 differences	 is	 disagreement	 over	 the	 purpose	 for	which	 cross-examination	 is	
necessary.		
While	methodology	does	not	cause	the	disagreement,	it	helps	to	resolve	the	the	issue.	















									 Demeanour	 evidence	 remains	 as	 important	 a	 factor	 in	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 as	 it	 was	


















in	admitting	hearsay	evidence.	However,	 the	 test	 fails	 to	 recognize	 litigation	procedures	 that	
enhance	the	two	types	of	unfairness.	A	third	type	of	unfairness	exists	due	to	criminal	litigation	
procedures	that	change	the	strategy	of	cross-examination	for	accused	parties.	
There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 and	 the	 practical	
application	 of	 the	 following	 exceptions	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule:	 admissions,	 res	 gestae,	 dying	
declarations,	 the	 co-conspirator’s	 exception,	 and	 prior	 inconsistent	 statements.	 Prior	




criminal	 trials	 to	 make	 a	 strategic	 decision	 that	 did	 not	 exist	 when	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 was	
developed.	The	impact	of	fairness	in	the	adversarial	process	is	rendered	less	influential	than	it	
was	historically.	
The	 presumption	 in	 the	 res	 gestae	 exception	 that	 reliability	 is	 derived	 from	
contemporaneity	can	cause	the	factors	of	lack	of	oath,	demeanour	evidence,	and	opportunity	to	
cross-examine	 the	 declarant	 to	 wield	 less	 influence	 than	 they	 did	 under	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	
historical	rationale.	
Like	the	res	gestae	exception,	dying	declarations	are	premised	on	a	conflation	between	







exceptions	 and	 the	 hearsay	 rule’s	 historical	 rationale	 are	 applicable	 to	 the	 co-conspirators	
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